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NO. 15 MARCH 2020 Introduction 
Iran’s Multi-Faceted Strategy in 
Deir ez-Zor 
From Fighting Terrorism to Creating a Zone of Influence 
Hamidreza Azizi 
One aspect of Iran’s involvement in Syria that has come under the spotlight recently 
is Iran’s growing presence and activities in Deir ez-Zor province in eastern Syria. Not 
only has Iran established its military presence in the region by deploying troops and 
constructing military bases, it has also been active in social, cultural, and economic 
spheres. Many observers believe that Iran’s goal is to establish a “land corridor” to 
connect the country to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Others argue that Iran is attempt-
ing to expand its ideological influence in Deir ez-Zor by promoting Shi’ism. However, 
the Islamic Republic is pursuing a multifaceted strategy in the area. Tehran wants 
to establish an economic corridor to the Mediterranean to play a role in China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI). Iran is also trying to create a zone of influence in Syria’s 
east while strengthening its deterrence against Israel and the United States. Prevent-
ing the revival of the so-called Islamic State (IS) remains another priority. 
 
In November 2017, the Syrian army, along 
with Iranian and Iran-backed forces, man-
aged to retake the al-Bukamal area on 
the Syrian-Iraqi border from the so-called 
Islamic State. Earlier, Iraq’s Popular Mobili-
zation Units (PMU), supported by Iran, had 
liberated large swaths of Iraqi territory 
from the grip of the IS, bringing the town 
of al-Qa’im on the other side of the border 
under its control. The developments were 
particularly significant for Iran, as the other 
two – of three total – main border cross-
ings connecting Iraq to Syria are controlled 
by American forces or their local allies. The 
United States has turned the areas adjacent 
to al-Tanf crossing in southeastern Syria 
into its main military base in the country, 
and the al-Ya’roubiya crossing in the north 
is controlled by the US-backed and Kurdish-
dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. 
Over the past two years, Iranian and 
Iran-backed forces have been stationed in 
various areas in the southern half of Deir 
ez-Zor province. Furthermore, by recruiting 
local forces, Iran has created new paramili-
tary groups in the region, for example the 
so-called Villages Army (Jaish al-Qura), con-
sisting of more than 2,500 Arab fighters 
from the province’s villages. Iran has also 
built at least two military bases: in the 
western outskirts of the town of al-Mayadin 
and in al-Bukamal. At the same time, the 
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Islamic Republic has set up cultural centers 
in Deir ez-Zor to promote Shia principles and 
the ideology of the Islamic Revolution, and 
Iran’s Jihad of Construction (Jihad al-Bina’) 
organization has been active in carrying out 
reconstruction and infrastructure projects in 
the province. Iran has also sought to estab-
lish a network of loyal forces in the region 
by liaising with the heads of Deir ez-Zor 
tribes. Apart from trying to benefit from 
Iran’s financial incentives and reconstruc-
tion projects, some local tribes see Iran as 
a more reliable partner than the Assad 
regime. All of these measures indicate a 
long-term Iranian strategy for the area. 
The “Land Corridor” 
A dominant view among analysts and 
policy-makers in the West and the Arab 
world is that the Islamic Republic is seek-
ing to establish a land corridor to connect 
the country to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. 
According to this view, the corridor would 
allow Iran to support its proxy groups in 
the three countries more effectively, as 
well as to transfer weapons and equipment 
unhindered to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Yet, 
the priority of the corridor in Iran’s Syria 
strategy appears to have been exaggerated. 
Since the early stages of the Syrian crisis up 
until the end of 2017, despite the lack of 
access to Iraqi-Syrian border crossings, Iran 
continued to support Hezbollah in a variety 
of ways, including the use of an air corri-
dor. Meanwhile, given the US military 
presence in various parts of Iraq and Syria 
on the one hand, and Israel’s information 
superiority over both countries on the 
other, a direct transfer of arms and equip-
ment through this so-called land corridor 
would entail serious risks. Between 2016 
and 2018, Israel reportedly struck Iranian 
targets in Syria more than 200 times. 
The importance of the al-Bukamal/ 
al-Qa’im border crossing for Iran from 
the military point of view is more about 
facilitating the passage of military and 
paramilitary forces across the Syrian-Iraqi 
border. Iran’s control over the areas on both 
sides of the border makes it easier for the 
Iranian and Iran-backed forces to move back 
and forth and be redeployed to other areas. 
For example, in February and March 2020, 
during the Syrian army’s military campaign 
in the northwestern province of Idlib, some 
400 Iraqi PMU forces were dispatched to 
the Idlib front, passing this border crossing. 
The increased mobility for the Iran-backed 
forces could make them partly immune to 
the occasional American and Israeli strikes. 
The withdrawal of American troops from 
a base in al-Qa’im in mid-March increases 
Iran’s maneuvering power in the area. 
The Economic Dimension 
Since 2013, realizing the BRI has been 
the main priority in China’s foreign policy 
and is aimed at facilitating commercial 
exchanges between the East and the West. 
Initial plans for connecting China to Europe 
prioritized the northern land routes via 
Russia and Central Asia, as well as a mari-
time route through the Persian Gulf. How-
ever, Tehran has been trying to draw Bei-
jing’s interest to a southern land route 
linking Iran, Iraq, and Syria with the Medi-
terranean and then Europe. 
In November 2018, Iran unveiled a plan 
to build a railway linking the Shalamcheh 
border crossing at the Iran-Iraq border to 
the Port of Basra in southeastern Iraq. The 
railroad would then further expand toward 
the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean. Also, 
in Spring 2019, it was announced that Iran 
was planning to lease the container termi-
nal of the Port of Latakia. There is no doubt 
that Iran’s involvement in Syria has a strong 
economic component. Controlling the vola-
tile and unstable areas of western Iraq and 
eastern Syria is essential to achieving its 
economic plans for the region. 
A Zone of Influence 
Iran’s primary goal of intervening in the 
Syrian crisis in 2012 was to keep its ally 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power. 
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With the rise of the IS, fighting the terror-
ists and preventing them from advancing 
toward the Iranian borders was added to 
Iran’s list of priorities. However, Iran’s 
active contribution to the Syrian army’s 
recapture of Aleppo at the end of 2016 – 
and then the collapse of the self-proclaimed 
IS caliphate in late 2017 – gradually led 
Iran to define new goals and interests in 
Syria. Since then, there have been signs of 
a more expansionist orientation in Iran’s 
Syria strategy. Since 2018, Iran has signed 
a series of economic agreements with the 
Syrian government, signifying Iran’s desire 
to assume an active role in Syria’s post-war 
reconstruction. Also, in August 2018, Iran 
and Syria signed an agreement on military 
cooperation. 
At the same time, Iranian decision-makers 
in the administration and the Islamic Revo-
lutionary Guard Corps are well aware that 
there is no guarantee that those agreements 
will be implemented, also in the long term. 
Iran’s influence in Syria has so far been 
mostly based on its direct ties with Assad 
and pro-Iran circles in the Syrian govern-
ment and army. However, even within the 
current structure of the Syrian government, 
there are some unfavorable views toward 
Iran’s presence and intervention in the 
country, especially among the pro-Russia 
figures. In case of Assad’s departure from 
power or a change in Syria’s political sys-
tem – for example, through decentraliza-
tion – Iran’s role and influence in Syria 
would be at stake. 
In this vein, Iran appears to be pursuing 
the establishment of a geopolitical and 
social zone of influence in Syria as an alter-
native approach or a “Plan B.” Moves such 
as promoting Shi’ism or creating new para-
military groups in Deir ez-Zor should be 
seen as an attempt by Iran to establish a 
loyal social base in a specific area in Syria. 
Enjoying control over such a zone of in-
fluence could guarantee Iran’s long-term 
interests in Syria in the face of any poten-
tial challenges. For example, if a federal 
system were to be established in Syria, 
Iran’s position in one of the potentially 
crucial federal units in the east and south-
east would remain intact. Likewise, if the 
Islamic Republic succeeds in changing the 
social and cultural structure of Deir ez-Zor, 
representatives loyal to Iran would safe-
guard Tehran’s interests in a potential par-
liamentary system in Syria. Having a spe-
cific zone of influence could also provide 
Iran with a valuable bargaining chip in 
negotiations for the future of Syria. 
An Extra Layer of Deterrence 
Although Iran and Israel have never 
engaged in a direct military confrontation 
in more than four decades since the estab-
lishment of the Islamic Republic, building a 
set of effective and credible threats against 
each other is one of the main pillars of both 
countries’ military and defense strategies. 
As far as Iran is concerned, this approach 
has been implemented in two main ways: 
developing its missile program, and creat-
ing a network of proxies throughout the 
region. Before the Syrian crisis, this net-
work was mainly based in Lebanon and 
Palestine. However, the power vacuum that 
has emerged in Syria in recent years has 
allowed Iran to extend the network to 
Syrian territory. 
Indeed, because of their geographical 
proximity to Israel, areas such as Dara’a 
would be more suitable for Iran to establish 
a long-term presence. However, Tel Aviv’s 
complete military dominance over those 
areas, on the one hand, and Russia’s oppo-
sition to the expansion of Iranian military 
influence in western and southwestern 
Syria on the other, have made it difficult 
for Iran to realize such ambitions. In this 
context, Deir ez-Zor’s distance from the 
Israeli border, as well as Russia’s apparent 
lack of interest in that part of Syria, has 
made the region the key goal in Iran’s long-
term plans. As it is located between the 
areas controlled by the United States and its 
allies in al-Tanf and the eastern Euphrates, 
Deir ez-Zor also puts Iran in a position to 
make a credible threat against US forces in 
Syria. Following the US assassination of 
Iran’s Quds Force commander, Qassem 
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Soleimani, in January 2020, there were 
legitimate speculations about Iran’s 
potential use of those areas to retaliate 
against the United States. 
Preventing the Revival of the IS 
During the height of IS power, controlling 
the eastern areas of Syria in Deir ez-Zor 
and the province of Anbar in western Iraq 
allowed the terrorists to move freely on 
both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian border. Ac-
cordingly, the principal basis of Iran’s 
strategy to combat the IS was to cut this 
link. Even after the official collapse of the 
IS caliphate, Iran’s approach toward pre-
venting the revival of the terrorist group 
has focused on these areas. Iran sees a mili-
tary presence in Deir ez-Zor as being neces-
sary to avert the rejoining of dispersed IS 
cells in Iraq and Syria. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
By trying to expand and consolidate its 
influence in Deir ez-Zor, Iran is eyeing the 
achievement of a set of long-term geopoliti-
cal, economic, security, and military goals. 
Another important reason is its concern 
of being completely sidelined by the other 
actors in the diplomatic processes. 
Germany and its partners in the Euro-
pean Union should assume a more active 
role by trying to address the situation with 
a political solution and engage all actors, 
including Iran, in international diplomatic 
processes aimed at conflict settlement and 
an eventual withdrawal of all foreign troops 
from Syria. Seeking points of overlap be-
tween – and strengthening the joint efforts 
of – the different multilateral formats on 
Syria (the Astana Format, the Geneva Pro-
cess, and the Small Group) would allow 
the Europeans to, among other objectives, 
address the challenging aspects of Iran’s 
strategy in Deir ez-Zor, that is, the exten-
sion of its military presence and the estab-
lishment of new paramilitary groups. At 
the same time, Iran’s focus on combating IS 
remnants and the potential for extending 
the Chinese BRI to the Mediterranean would 
be aspects from which Europe could benefit. 
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